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CHINA’S RISE, THE U.S., AND THE WTO: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS THEORY 
Jacques deLisle* 
What do China’s dramatic economic rise, engagement with the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) (and other established features of the international 
economic legal order), and rising assertiveness in external relations tell us about 
China’s past and likely future relationship to status quo international economic 
legal institutions and the norms they instantiate? What do these developments 
indicate about prospects for those institutions and norms? In China’s Rise: How 
it Took on the U.S. at the WTO, Gregory Shaffer and Henry Gao offer, or point 
us toward, answers to these questions. They do so on a grander scale than their 
relatively modest title indicates. In doing so, they engage seriously (if at times 
implicitly) with international relations theory and provide rich, original empirical 
support from fieldwork interviews. Their discussion of the relatively recent 
past—and its legacy—provides grounds for optimism among those who favor an 
institutionally robust and liberal international economic legal order. Yet, their 
analysis also finds, or suggests, ample reasons for pessimism in recent behavior 
and experiences of China and the U.S. in the WTO, and other developments in 
China, the U.S., and U.S.-China relations. 
This response supplements and complements Shaffer and Gao’s analysis. 
The history of China’s participation in the WTO, and the largely liberal order of 
which the WTO is a key element, is ambivalent—perhaps more than can be con-
veyed in an account that gives center stage to Chinese informants who have fa-
vored adherence to international norms and participation in international institu-
tions. The future may be more fraught than can be fully captured in a relatively 
brief final section of an article that focuses primarily on evaluating the past. This 
response addresses these issues from perspectives of international relations the-
ories (many of which Shaffer and Gao note) and their application to China’s en-
gagement with the WTO and related matters. The sections that follow are ar-
ranged, roughly, from least to most pessimistic (except for a final subsection). 
I. CONSTRUCTIVISM: AN UNCERTAIN VERDICT ABOUT CONVERGENCE 
In the argot of international relations theory, Shaffer and Gao offer a partly 
(I would say largely) “constructivist” analysis of China’s approach to the WTO 
and the international economic legal regime centered on the WTO.1 For a con-
structivist, a state’s behavior can be shaped by its socialization into acceptance 
                                                        
 *  Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. 
 1. See Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 101, 105 n.19. 
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of international norms, including by means of a state’s integration into interna-
tional institutions.2  
At a general level, China’s approach to the WTO and related norms is a 
well-known tale that appears to fit constructivist theory. From the beginning of 
its Post-Mao Reform Era, China has sought to join the international economy 
and its major institutions, largely on status quo-accepting terms. “Moderniza-
tion”—economic development—has been the defining policy goal of the Reform 
Era. China has pursued economic development through “opening” (to the outside 
world) and “reform” (at home). “Opening” meant adapting to prevailing interna-
tional norms and rules for trade and other matters (including transnational invest-
ment) as means for attracting foreign capital and know-how—initially concen-
trated in export-oriented industries that depended on access to foreign markets. 
“Reform” meant market-oriented changes to domestic policies and institutions 
and a much more robust, market-supporting legal system. These changes entailed 
extensive borrowing from, and convergence with, legal rules and norms preva-
lent in major developed economies and, in turn, reflected in the GATT/WTO and 
other institutions that had been created by the U.S. and states with similar inter-
ests and values.3 
As the Reform Era progressed, evidence accumulated to support a construc-
tivist account. China sought ardently to rejoin the GATT (beginning in 1986) and 
to become a founding member of the WTO (in 1995). When China joined the 
WTO in 2001, it accepted notably unfavorable terms. The conditions included 
foregoing special accommodations that had been offered to developing countries 
and post-socialist transitional economies, and granting trading partners excep-
tional powers to impose barriers in response to rising Chinese exports. Zhu 
Rongji, China’s redoubtable premier during the run-up to China’s accession, had 
taken significant political risk in offering concessions that sought—and initially 
failed to achieve—U.S. support of China’s WTO candidacy during Clinton’s 
presidency. The reward Zhu sought was a lever—in the form of binding interna-
tional legal obligations—to advance economic reforms that would bring China 
more into line with market principles and international norms. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, China joined the other major institutions of the international 
economic legal order, almost entirely on status quo-accepting terms. As one 
prominent assessment by an American scholar put it, China was “playing our 
game.”4 
                                                        
 2. MARTHA FINNEMORE AND MICHAEL N. BARNETT, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGAN- 
IZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Con-
struction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 392 (1992). For a constructivist analysis of China’s interaction 
with international law and institutions, see generally ALISATAIR IAIN JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN IN- 
TERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 1980-2000 (2008). 
 3. GREGORY T. CHIN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHINA: THE GLOBAL CONVERSATION 
(Margaret Pearson and Wang Yong eds., 2015); Jacques deLisle, Law and Economy in China, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 255–79 (Gregory C. Chow and Dwight H. Perkins eds. 2014).  
 4. Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West, 11 J. E. Asian 
Stud. 331 (2010); see also CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth C. Economy, et al. 
eds., 1998); Jacques deLisle, China and the WTO: Evolving Agendas of Economic Openness, Domestic Reform, 
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As this suggests, and notwithstanding Washington’s resistance to China’s 
initial push for WTO membership, a constructivist perspective has been imma-
nent in U.S. policy toward China and its participation in the WTO. Bringing 
China into international economic legal institutions has been part of the U.S.’s 
broader strategy toward China. The policy of “constructive engagement” with 
China has rested on “constructivist” premises. Tellingly, President Clinton 
pressed Congress to take necessary legislative steps (including granting China 
normal trading relations or “most favored nation” status) for China’s WTO entry 
by arguing that bringing China into the organization would help change China in 
ways that would promote U.S. preferences and interests and align with prevailing 
international economic (and perhaps liberal-democratic political) norms.5 
China’s post-accession approach to the WTO has been something of a 
mixed bag for a constructivist account. On one hand, China has undertaken the 
massive reform efforts that Shaffer and Gao detail: Extensive revisions to Chi-
nese laws to comply with WTO requirements, major investments in capacity-
building for WTO and trade law, and significant drives to promote public and 
official awareness of WTO commitments and the regime’s stated commitment 
to those commitments. China has become one of the leading users of the WTO’s 
dispute resolution procedures and has prevailed in significant cases as complain-
ant and respondent. More broadly, China’s arguments in defense of its own laws 
and practices—and its complaints about other states—have remained infra legem 
in the WTO and elsewhere; that is, China has purported to argue in terms of what 
WTO law requires, rather than launching attacks against existing law.6 
Moreover, some illiberalism in China's approach to international economic 
law is consistent with complying with WTO law, making permissible use of 
WTO processes, and accepting extant rules. As Shaffer and Gao remind us, 
China has learned, quickly and well, to play the game of using WTO law and 
procedures to press interests and preferences that sometimes are at odds with 
liberal principles and U.S. agendas (which themselves can be illiberal). And, 
Shaffer and Gao also tell us, China may have learned these skills, and a some-
what cynical attitude toward ostensibly fundamental liberal norms in interna-
tional trade law, from the United States.7 For the U.S. policy of constructive en-
gagement, therein lies an abject lesson of “be careful what you wish for because 
                                                        
and International Status, and Challengers of the Post-Accession Era, in CHINA UNDER HU JINTAO: 
OPPORTUNITIES, DANGERS, AND DILEMMAS 229–92 (Tun-jen Cheng, et al. eds., 2005); Pitman B. Potter, Glob-
alization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 119 (2003).  
 5. The President’s News Conference, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 29, 2000), http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58305 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018); Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2000), https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/030900clinton-china-text.html.  
 6. See, e.g., CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: CHINA’S FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (Ka Zeng and Wei Liang eds., 2013); Ben Baden, China’s Role in the WTO, CHINA BUS. REV., 
(Oct. 1, 2011) https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-role-in-the-wto/ (assessing China’s first decade in 
the WTO by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy).  
 7. Shaffer & Gao, supra note 1, at 105. See generally Xiaowen Zhang & Xiaoling Li, The Politics of 
Compliance with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings in China, 85 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 143 (2014).  
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you may get it.” This lesson may become more painful as China continues to 
reap the benefits of its investments in building WTO and trade law capacity, 
while U.S. commitments by government and institutionally to sustaining capac-
ity show signs of serious erosion.8 For constructivists, this pattern is bittersweet, 
indicating China’s “socialization” to international practices and rules, yet in a 
form that may undermine more fundamental norms. 
Some nonconformity to WTO rules and obligations in Chinese positions 
and actions does not necessarily negate a constructivist account. Only an implau-
sibly extreme version of constructivism would see perfect performance as the 
relevant standard. Shirking and cheating, at some level, are to be expected, all 
the more so by a state that may be in the process of assimilating to established 
norms. WTO rules sometimes are indeterminate or contested, especially in ap-
plication to specific, challenged laws or policies. A challenge to, or attempt to 
change, existing rules is consistent with a constructivist account. As Shaffer and 
Gao note, the WTO regime contemplates that members will try to shape rules, 
so long as they do so through legally and institutionally proper means, and the 
opportunity to shape WTO rules was a major motivation for China in entering 
the WTO.9 
On the other hand, China has faced extensive and wide-ranging criticism, 
including from the U.S. government, industry, and interest groups, for violating 
WTO obligations and flouting WTO rules.10 China has been the most frequent 
target of complaints in the WTO’s formal dispute resolution process and has lost 
in significant cases. China’s formally law-abiding response to WTO rulings may 
be less than meets the eye—“paper compliance” in the language of one notewor-
thy study.11 
More fundamentally, the bar for success in constructivist analysis will have 
been set disconcertingly low if much of the evidence is “compliance” in forms 
such as China: exploiting opportunities that the WTO regime provides to depart 
                                                        
 8. Karen E. Bravo, International Economic Law in US Law Schools, https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/instruc-
tors/Bravo/IntlEconomicLaw_Ch10.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2018) (concerning limited teaching of, and support 
for, international economic law at U.S. law schools); Sharon LaFranier, et al., Prerequisite for Key White House 
Posts: Loyalty, Not Experience, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/us/poli-
tics/trump-advisers-experience.html; Brett Schaefer, How to Make the State Department More Effective at Im-
plementing U.S. Foreign Policy, HERITAGE FOUND. (April 20, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/political-pro-
cess/report/how-make-the-state-department-more-effective-implementing-us-foreign.  
 9. deLisle, supra note 4, at 229–92; Shaffer & Gao, supra note 1, at 105. For Chinese views indicating 
rule-shaping as among China’s goals, see generally Lin Guijun & Tang Bi, China’s Role in the WTO: Opening 
Up as a Way to Push Forward Reforms and Combat Trade Protectionism, in CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION 
REASSESSED 439 (Wang Luolin ed., 2015); Wang Yong, WTO Accession, Globalization, and a Changing China, 
CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 1, 2011), https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/wto-accession-globalization-and-a-
changing-china/.  
 10. 2016 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance, UNITED STATES TRADE REP. (Jan. 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-Report-to-Congress.pdf; Stephanie Henry, USCBC Testifies on 
China’s WTO Track Record, US-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.uschina.org/washington-up-
date/uscbc-testifies-china%E2%80%99s-wto-track-record. 
 11. Timothy Webster, Paper Compliance: How China Implements WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
525, 530 (2014). 
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from the predominantly liberal international legal norms and principles that un-
derpin the WTO; making implausible arguments about the content of WTO law 
in an effort to legitimate problematic actions, policies, or laws; feigning compli-
ance with WTO rules or rulings; or not exceeding some high threshold of shirk-
ing and violating. 
II. TRANSNATIONAL INTEREST GROUP POLITICS: SUPPLEMENTARY 
EXPLANATION AND VULNERABLE PATHWAY 
A distinctive strength of Shaffer and Gao’s analysis is that it goes beyond 
most constructivist interpretations of China’s WTO behavior. It provides an em-
pirical account of an important mechanism by which the socialization and assim-
ilation that are central to constructivism occurs. 
Facing the demands of WTO entry and membership, China invested heav-
ily in building legal capacity to fulfill WTO obligations and to defend China’s 
rights and assert China’s interests in the WTO. Efforts that focused initially on 
academia and government spread to private law firms and industry. The govern-
ment’s trumpeting its commitment to WTO engagement directly and indirectly 
incentivized law firms and state-linked enterprises to take WTO law seriously. 
Through a combination of concerted effort and benevolent contagion, stakehold-
ers emerged among scholars and lawyers outside the state and among legal staff-
ers in China’s vast bureaucracy (especially the Ministry of Commerce) whose 
professional identity, self-interest, and subjective preferences became aligned 
with China’s embrace of the WTO, its legal rules, and associated liberal norms 
of international economic law. Some in this cohort forged supportive bonds with 
counterparts outside China, in a latter-day, less formal, and more diffuse echo of 
the top leadership’s earlier strategy of joining the WTO to create international 
pressure for domestic reforms. As staff of other state organs and officers of major 
enterprises became more familiar and comfortable with the WTO and its legal 
rules, and as they came to see how WTO law could work to their advantage, they 
too began to support, or at least accept, China’s deepened and largely pro-status 
quo approach to the WTO.12 
While these aspects of Shaffer and Gao’s account support a constructivist 
explanation, they also fit—as Shaffer and Gao note when they characterize their 
account as “most closely resemble[ing] historical institutional theory”—with 
older traditions in international relations theory that look to interdependence and 
its interaction with pluralistic domestic politics. On such views, state behavior 
can be explained by domestic interest group politics, with interest groups some-
times drawing strength from transnational linkages—often rooted in interna-
                                                        
 12. Shaffer & Gao, supra note 1, at 119. 
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tional economic ties—to actors abroad who have common interests or prefer-
ences.13 Despite its persisting authoritarian political order, Reform-Era China 
does have something akin to interest group politics. With the repudiation of Mao-
Era autarchy, there has been much more room for interest groups to form trans-
national linkages.14 
Shaffer and Gao’s recounting of the emergence, roles, and agendas of 
China’s cadre of internationally connected WTO lawyers fits with this line of 
international relations thinking and will resonate with many observers of Re-
form-Era China’s cosmopolitan legal elites and other pro-reform elites. What 
Shaffer and Gao document in the WTO realm rings true more generally. These 
Chinese scholars, officials, and practicing lawyers have been a formidable force. 
They have been significant interest groups, favoring generally liberal and inter-
national norm-assimilating legal development in China. For much of the Reform 
Era, their transnational connections have given them intellectual, normative, and 
political heft in domestic political contests over China’s interactions with inter-
national legal institutions and norms. 
The challenge, for an account of China’s WTO-relevant behavior that rests 
on claims about interdependence-driven transnational linkages and domestic in-
terest groups, is whether these interest groups are truly influential and likely to 
remain so. There are reasons (including ones to be found in Shaffer and Gao’s 
analysis) to be skeptical in the case of China’s cohort of “pro-WTO” lawyers. 
Shaffer and Gao are careful to note the limits of their interview data and con-
scious of the perils of selection bias in the subset of relevant actors whom they 
reached. Still, they cannot entirely overcome the possibility of skewing effects 
from focusing on a group—China’s WTO-savvy and WTO-sympathizing law-
yers—that, like many participant-informants, may be inclined to overrate or 
overstate their impact and influence. WTO-conforming behavior by Chinese 
state actors may be spurred by one or more of several factors, including ones 
consistent with other international relations theories that leave little room for the 
agency of domestic interest groups and, in turn, the impact of their foreign coun-
terparts. 
Less abstractly, China’s commitment to international trade law, and espe-
cially to broader values of liberalism or legality in international economic rela-
tions, appears to be uneven, even among the relatively small group of legally 
trained and law-engaged Chinese on whom Shaffer and Gao focus. For some law 
firm lawyers, trade law and trade cases appear to be one way of seeking govern-
ment favor or business.15 For some government lawyers, WTO law may be part 
                                                        
 13. Id. at 105 n.19. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDE- 
PENDENCE (1977); HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION DOMESTIC POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997).  
 14. See, e.g., SUSAN L. SHIRK, HOW CHINA OPENED ITS DOOR: THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF THE PRC’S 
FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT REFORMS (1994); Erica S. Downs, New Interest Groups in Chinese Foreign 
Policy, JOHN L. THORNTON CHINA CTR., BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 13, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/testimo-
nies/new-interest-groups-in-chinese-foreign-policy/. 
 15. Shaffer & Gao, supra note 1, at 105. 
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of their political or policy mandate of the moment, subject to supersession by 
new priorities and directives from above. For some legal academics, international 
trade law may be a route to funding and status—perhaps not easily abandoned as 
a practical matter but something less than a deep calling or defining passion. 
Moreover, such “pro-WTO” or liberal-legal-internationalist interest groups 
and supportive transnational linkages face additional possible limits rooted in 
elite politics. The top leadership’s pursuit of WTO membership that gave rise to 
“WTO fever” in China was only partly about policies of liberalization and open-
ness for the economy. It was also about recentralization of power after more than 
a decade of reform had dispersed authority and led to what top leaders regarded 
as dangerous governmental indiscipline and frustrating policy inconsistency. 
Nearly twenty years later, the Chinese regime has become more critical of for-
eign ideas and the influence in China of foreign organizations.16 
III. SECOND IMAGE THEORIES: POLITICAL SYSTEM-TYPE AND LEADERSHIP 
CHOICE. 
As the foregoing suggests, developments under Xi Jinping—layered on un-
derlying features of China’s political system—have not been entirely salutary for 
the agenda or influence of pro-liberalization, pro-trade, pro-WTO lawyers. The 
Xi era has brought rises in: economic nationalism (which can be in tension with 
WTO liberalization norms); skepticism toward “Western values,” including es-
pecially economic and legal models, and Western prescriptions for international 
economic norms and rules (which suffered a severe loss of prestige amid the 
Global Financial Crisis); suspicion toward Western influences (which extends to 
foreign partners and allies of China’s transnationally linked trade lawyers and 
legal intellectuals); political illiberalism (which is in some tension with economic 
liberalism and has rarely been good for intellectuals of any stripe in post-1949 
China); and reallocation of decision-making power from government institutions 
to party organs and from more established institutional structures to small, ad 
hoc leading small groups (which tends to reduce the influence of technocratic 
specialists, including trade lawyers). 
To be sure, moves and signals of the Xi era have been mixed. A major Party 
Central Committee policy document and other official pronouncements have set 
forth an ambitious agenda of market-oriented and international norm-conforming 
economic reforms, sometimes framed as a “new development model” for China. 
                                                        
 16. LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE MANAGEMENT OF OVERSEAS NON-GOVERN- 
MENTAL ACTIVITIES IN CHINA (2016); Chris Buckley, China Takes Aim at Western Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo. 
html; Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere, GEN. OFF. CENT. COMMITTEE COMMUNIST 
PARTY CHINA (Apr. 22, 2013) (generally known as “Document Number 9,” translation available at http://www. 
chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation); What Does China’s New ‘Foreign NGO Law’ Mean for Your 
Organization?, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COM. CHINA (July 2016) https://www.amchamchina.org/policy-advo-
cacy/what-does-chinas-new-foreign-ngo-law-mean-for-your-organization. 
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Such sources have articulated a policy of engaging more actively with interna-
tional law (albeit partly to achieve changes favored by China).17 Amid the Pres-
ident-Trump-led abandonment by the U.S. of a leadership role, Xi and Premier 
Li Keqiang have moved to position China as the avatar of international economic 
liberalism and globalization.18 Therein lie some reasons for hope that the cadre 
of trained trade lawyers identified by Shaffer and Gao, and their cosmopolitan 
and liberal views, can have influence. While such considerations matter in as-
sessing an account of China’s international behavior that emphasizes interest 
groups and transnational linkages, they also point to an analysis rooted in a very 
different version of international relations theory. 
From a “second image” perspective, a state’s international behavior reflects 
its domestic political system.19 International relations analyses that emphasize 
domestic political system-type typically consider more fundamental or structural 
features. One such feature of China’s political system is its authoritarian charac-
ter—specifically the relatively high degree of autonomy that the top leadership 
exercises in setting policy direction, especially on matters that the leadership 
views as important and perhaps especially in external relations. Shaffer and Gao 
recognize this possibility. It is reflected, for example, in their reference to Zhu 
Rongji famously playing a “two-level game” (in making international commit-
ments to create leverage to force through painful, resistance-provoking domestic 
reforms).20 This recognition presumably also underlies the importance Shaffer 
and Gao attach to the policy choices of Xi Jinping, who has emerged as China’s 
most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping and, perhaps, since Mao Zedong.21 
                                                        
 17. CHINESE LEGAL REFORM AND THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER: ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION (Yun Zhao 
& Michael Ng eds., 2017); CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehen-
sively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Oct. 28, 
2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-
some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/; 
Jacques deLisle, Xi Jinping’s Impact on China’s Legal Development: Domestic and International, ASAN F. (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://www.theasanforum.org/xi-jinpings-impact-on-chinas-legal-development-domestic-and-inter-
national/.  
 18. Jamil Anderlini & Wang Feng, Xi Jinping Delivers Robust Defence of Globalisation at Davos, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce; Xi Jinping, Key-
note Speech at the World Economic Forum (Jan. 17, 2017), https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-
jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum; Li Tao, Chinese Premier Underscores Support for Free Trade, 
Globalization, XINHUA NET (Sept. 13, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/13/c_136604429.htm.  
 19. KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 80–159 (1959); Joe Dagan, Regime Type, Foreign Pol-
icy, and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert A. Denmark ed., 2010) 
(summarizing domestic regime-type-based theories of international relations); see also Peter Gourevitch, The 
Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881 (1978).  
 20. deLisle, supra note 4, at 262 n.31; John Fewsmith, The Political and Social Implications of China’s 
Accession to the WTO, 167 CHINA Q. 573 (2001); see also Shaffer & Gao, supra note 1, at 105 n.19. 
 21. Shaffer and Gao, supra note 1, at 171; Simon Denyer, China’s Leader Elevated to the Level of Mao in 
Communist Pantheon, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-leader-ele-
vated-to-the-level-of-mao-in-communist-pantheon/2017/10/24/ddd911e0-b832-11e7-9b93-
b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.32dfce91f30a; Victor Shih & Jude Blanchette, 1.3 Billion People Are in 
One Man’s Grip, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 16, 2017) http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/16/1-3-billion-people-are-in-
one-mans-grip-xi-jinping-china-party-congress/.  
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Another related feature of “system type” is China’s having been an author-
itarian developmental state. This characteristic (along with the discretionary pol-
icy choices of powerful leaders) has favored extensive engagement with the 
WTO, extensive conformity to WTO rules and norms, and concomitant reforms 
to the domestic economy to align more closely with prevailing global patterns. 
But, such behavior does not imply the thoroughgoing convergence that some an-
alytical perspectives of international relations theory might predict. Rather, on 
this view, China’s approach to the WTO has been instrumental to other goals, 
primarily economic development and maintaining the regime’s grip on political 
power (in part through delivering economic gains to its subjects). Thus, steps 
toward assimilation to international norms may prove to be a matter of harvesting 
low-hanging fruit—of taking relatively easy steps that offer clear gains with few 
risks. But, past performance becomes a weaker predictor of future results if the 
preexisting authoritarian political order, rather than the socializing influence of 
relatively liberal international norms or the clout of relatively liberal (and trans-
nationally linked) interest groups in pluralistic domestic politics, determines how 
China engages the international system.22 
Other attributes of China’s political system might limit China’s embrace of 
liberal norms and rules that underpin the WTO and other international economic 
legal institutions. The Xi era has offered evidence for those who argue that 
China’s political economy remains statist—or state capitalist—and thus in ten-
sion with liberal international norms.23 As some analysts see it, the WTO pre-
sumes market economies, but China is—and seems likely to remain for some 
time—out of step with strong versions of that presumption and thus ill-equipped 
to achieve full compliance with some WTO norms or rules. Some critical assess-
ments of China’s WTO engagement have gone further, arguing that the WTO 
presumes, and effective compliance in practice requires, a political-legal order 
very different from China’s—one that is qualitatively more liberal and more law-
governed.24 
On the other hand, China’s approach to the WTO need not be fixed in stone. 
Claims of entrenched incompatibility between basic features of China’s domestic 
political system and the types of international behavior demanded by the WTO 
or broader international liberal economic norms are controversial and arguably 
overdrawn. China’s engagement with the WTO and other international institu-
tions has changed much more than have basic features of China’s political sys-
tem. Many WTO members have accepted China’s certification as a “market 
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economy.” Further, major changes in Chinese behavior are all the more possible, 
because one characteristic of China’s political order is room for top leaders to 
make dramatic changes. This is one plausible characterization of the launch of 
“reform and opening” under Deng—a second major wave of reforms (including 
those associated with WTO accession) under Jiang Zemin and a possible new 
inflection point under Xi (as an especially powerful ruler of an unprecedentedly 
powerful China). As this last point suggests, a major factor that could affect elite 
preferences or more directly alter China’s international behavior is China’s trans-
formation from a developing state seeking acceptance in the international order 
into a great power with the capacity and will to alter the rules and institutions to 
serve its interests and preferences. 
IV. REALISM: POWER SHIFT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
China’s rise, the relative decline of the United States, and the resulting 
growth in China’s potential to reshape the WTO and other international eco-
nomic legal institutions and rules point to the possible explanatory power of an-
other venerable school of international relations thinking: “realism” and its var-
iants (such as structural realism or offensive realism). From a realist perspective, 
a state’s power and the distribution of power among states explains and predicts 
how a state will behave, including its conformity to, support for, or investment 
in international institutions (including legal ones). Shaffer and Gao allow for this 
possibility as well. The rising clout and assertiveness of China, relative to a wan-
ing or withdrawing U.S., accounts for much of the shadow of uncertainty that 
falls over their final section on possible futures.25 
For the international relations realist, China’s status as a rising power por-
tends a less passive and accepting posture toward international institutions and 
rules, including the WTO and WTO law. A more powerful China is more likely 
to press for accommodation of its interests and agendas and may challenge or opt 
out of regimes that are not sufficiently receptive. Power transition theory and 
offensive realism envision especially bleak prospects. On such accounts, China’s 
rise risks developments akin to those that accompanied the ascent of Germany 
and Japan a century earlier. Even if a “tragedy of great power” politics, a “Thu-
cydides trap,” and a full-blown “contest for supremacy” (in the terms used by 
scholars evaluating U.S.-China relations from a realist perspective) can be 
avoided, the status quo international order—its institutions and rules—forged by 
the previously dominant power, faces a crisis born of a newly ascendant power’s 
demands for revision.26 
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From this perspective, signs of growing peril for the WTO, other core in-
stitutions, and the norms they embody can be found in: China’s nonconformity 
to some WTO rules and obligations; China’s demand for a greater role for itself 
(and other rising powers) in decision-making in international economic institu-
tions; and China’s creation of new institutions (such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, China-centered regional trading 
pacts, and initiatives associated with China’s “One Belt One Road” policy) that 
could become rivals to status quo entities and regimes. Other warning signs in-
clude the disdain China’s leaders have shown toward Washington Consensus-
style orthodoxy and features of the Western-shaped or U.S.-led economic order 
that permitted the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.27 
The lack of deference toward established organizations and rules that a re-
alist analysis would expect from a rising power may be reinforced by China’s 
reaction to a long period of forced exclusion. In the standard Chinese account, 
China was: denied membership in the informal club of so-called “civilized” 
states in the nineteenth century; subjected to “semi-colonial” encroachment un-
der “unequal treaties” that greater powers imposed on China and claimed were 
consistent with international law; excluded from the process (particularly during 
the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century) of shaping ostensibly univer-
sal customary international law; and kept out, for decades, from the major inter-
national institutions that matter for international law, including the United Na-
tions, the International Court of Justice, and GATT/WTO.28 
On softer versions of realism as well, there are reasons for concern about 
the prospects for the WTO, kindred institutions, and related norms in interna-
tional economic law. The WTO and other key components of the contemporary 
international economic regime are credibly characterized as the fruits of hege-
monic stability.29 In the postwar era, the United States was a sufficiently domi-
nant power within the West—and, in the post-Cold War period, sufficiently dom-
inant globally—that Washington was willing to bear a disproportionate share of 
the costs in establishing and maintaining institutions such as GATT/WTO, the 
IMF, and the World Bank. Bearing outsized costs (whether in the form of direct 
outlays, tolerance for asymmetric rules or behavior that benefitted other parties, 
or structuring side payments or sanctions to induce compliant behavior by other 
parties) was acceptable or desirable to the U.S., because its hegemonic position 
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gave it a central role in shaping the regime and a large share of the benefits 
(whether purely economic or economic and geopolitical). 
Within a realist framework, the relative decline in power of the United 
States and the relative rise of a still-far-short-of-hegemonic China imperil such 
institutions and associated regimes. President Trump’s striking contempt for 
multilateralism in general, and the WTO and the trade regime more specifically, 
his withdrawal from the TPP and threat to scuttle NAFTA and to leave the WTO, 
and so on, may be a contributing cause, or an acute symptom, of the waning of 
American hegemony in the trade regime and the international economic order 
more broadly. Whichever way one characterizes developments under President 
Trump, they are negative indicators for status quo institutions and norms.30 
China is unlikely to replace the U.S. in underwriting the established order. 
China lacks the relative capacity that the U.S. held, first in the non-communist 
world and then globally, during the last three-quarters of a century. China’s for-
ays into possible institution-building or regime-creating have not entailed taking 
on a role akin to that of the U.S. in recent decades. China has sometimes tolerated 
unfavorable balances of benefits in trade pacts (such as the ASEAN-China Free 
Trade Area and the cross-Taiwan-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement), but these have generally, and in some cases persuasively, been re-
garded as partly using economic incentives and levers to advance political 
ends.31 This is not to say that the U.S.’s past investment in today’s established 
institutions was un-self-interested. But, China’s approach so far has appeared 
relatively transactional, and thin in providing durable international public goods. 
More straightforwardly, China has an uneven record of compliance with, and has 
made pointed criticism of, some existing rules and institutions. And, it has cre-
ated new organs and agreements that could challenge currently dominant, U.S.-
shaped ones. 
To be sure, China’s statements and actions toward the WTO and other com-
ponents of the existing regime of international economic law hardly have been 
unmixed. Negative signs coexist with positive or neutral ones. Xi has presented 
China as the pillar of globalization and guardian of international economic open-
ness and integration in the wake of the U.S.’s Trump-era retrenchment. China 
has pledged that the new institutions it has been supporting are supplements, not 
threats, to existing ones and were made necessary by the failure of the United 
States to support needed reforms in established organs to meet growing needs 
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and reflect changing patterns of global economic power. In the U.S., President 
Trump’s bluster has often outrun change in U.S. behavior. It is too soon to con-
clude that the Trumpian turn in the U.S. approach to the WTO and other institu-
tions of a liberal international economic order reflect a deep and permanent U.S. 
retreat. 
For the international relations realist, such seemingly positive signs are un-
convincing. They may reflect hollow promises, disingenuous rhetoric, or ves-
tiges of a fading order. At minimum, for the realist, they should not seduce ob-
servers into the sin of idealism.32 For the nonrealist or antirealist, the realist 
argument for dismissing such indications risks proving too much; at the extreme, 
the realist claims become nearly unfalsifiable. Across a range of international 
relations views, a key question is whether the WTO and its rules as currently 
constituted and other elements of the established regime for international eco-
nomic law can survive absent prior levels of support and leadership by the United 
States. 
V. POST-HEGEMONIC COOPERATION: IS THE WTO ROBUST ENOUGH? 
As the agnosticism and incipient pessimism that characterize the latter part 
of Shaffer and Gao’s article reflect, prospects for a robust WTO and an interna-
tional economic legal order centered on the WTO seem uncertain, or perhaps 
worse. From the perspective of several schools of international relations think-
ing, collaboration between the U.S. and China to support the existing order (with 
limited modifications) would be at least helpful and perhaps indispensable to 
sustain the current regime. Here, prospects do not seem, in important respects, 
highly encouraging. Under Xi, China’s rhetoric is strongly pro-status quo but is 
discounted widely, albeit to varying degrees.33 Under President Trump, the 
U.S.’s rhetoric has become radically status-quo-rejecting. On both sides, practice 
and more fine-grained policy have been much more ambivalent. Still, we seem a 
long way from a “G2” U.S.-China duopoly that could substitute for the prior 
combination of relatively strong support by a hegemonic United States and rela-
tively ardent constructivist convergence from a China that did not seek to reshape 
most international regimes.34 
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As this indicates, cooperation under the anarchic conditions of international 
relations is difficult—very much so according to realist analyses but significantly 
so from other theoretical perspectives as well. As institutionalist theories of in-
ternational relations stress, it helps to have in place robust institutions—often as 
an inheritance from a time when conditions were more favorable for cooperation, 
institution building, or regime creation.35 
The WTO and, in turn, the WTO-centered international economic legal re-
gime, seemingly fit this paradigm. After all, the WTO is a nearly universal mem-
bership organization. It has legal rules that address a vast range of economic is-
sues, extending well beyond traditional trade in goods to services, intellectual 
property rights, transnational investment, and much else. It has a famously for-
midable court-like dispute resolution system—one that has achieved a strong 
record of state compliance and one that has been nearly unique (as Shaffer and 
Gao point out) in securing China’s submission to formal international legal pro-
cess and its outcomes.36 So far, at least, China’s potentially revisionist initiatives 
have been presented as nested within the WTO’s capacious reach. Regional and 
mega-regional trade pacts have been framed as consistent with WTO rules on 
sub-universal trade pacts. China has presented the AIIB, NDB, and other initia-
tives as arrangements that will track the rules of established institutions, and they 
do not appear to pose near-term challenges to the status quo.37 
Yet, as Shaffer and Gao’s guarded look to the future reflects, there are many 
vulnerabilities here. The once-dynamic expansion of the WTO’s domain and 
ability to deepen international economic openness and integration have waned 
dramatically since the start of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. The locus 
of trade and expansive “trade-plus” deals has moved outside the WTO to more 
ad hoc arrangements, such as the China-centered Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and other multilateral accords. 
Major opportunities and challenges in international economic relations lie be-
yond the scope, or outside the core strengths, of the WTO: addressing allegations 
of relatively subtle violations of established norms and rules that occur through 
state-linked enterprises not playing by market principles; shaping rules for trans-
national investment or national industrial policy that are more complicated and 
                                                        
results not predicting or supporting close cooperation); Cong Mu, Wen Rules Out ‘G2’ Proposal, GLOBAL TIMES 
(May 22, 2009), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/431991.shtml.  
 35. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); KENNETH A. OYE, 
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986). 
 36. GERALD CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE, ARMS CONTROL, ENVIRONMENT- 
AL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS 79–110 (2005); Henry S. Gao, Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience 
and Lessons for China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005); John 
H. Jackson, Perceptions About the WTO Trade Institutions, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 101 (2002); Shaffer & Gao, 
supra note 1, at 108.  
 37. G. John Ikenberry & Darren J. Lim, China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-Hegemony, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 2017), https://www. 
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf; Phillip Y. Lipsey, 
Who’s Afraid of the AIIB: Why the United States Should Support China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
FOREIGN AFF. (May 7, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib. 
DELISLE ONLINE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2018  12:42 PM 
Spring] CHINA’S RISE, THE U.S., AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 71 
 
reach much farther into domestic economic regulation than the WTO’s invest-
ment regime has; and addressing transnational disharmony in environmental, la-
bor, and human rights standards.38 Although still in their infancy, the new insti-
tutions that China has created or might create could further reduce the relative 
importance of the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and kindred pillars of the existing 
order, and could generate norms and rules adverse to the current system. 
In this sense, China has acquired an option to support or undermine the 
WTO and the wider international economic legal regime, and China has been 
able to do so in part, because the United States under President Trump has re-
moved itself from the role it would ordinarily have played in pressing China to 
clarify its aims or contesting Beijing’s claim to the mantle of economic globali-
zation’s defender. In this unsettled and uncertain environment, much will depend 
on whether those who favor the broadly liberal international economic legal or-
der associated with the WTO—including the cadre of Chinese trade law experts 
considered by Shaffer and Gao, and groups in the U.S. appalled by Trumpian 
economic nationalism—will see, or make, their preferences prevail. 
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